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Abstract 
A series of crises and traumatic events, such as the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 global financial crisis, seem to have influ-
enced the environment within which modern political leaders act. We explore the scholarly literature on political lead-
ership and crisis since 2008 to evaluate what sorts of questions are being engaged, and identify some new lines of in-
quiry. We find several scholars are contributing much insight from the perspective of leadership and crisis 
management. Several analysts are investigating the politics of crisis from a decentralist perspective, focusing on local 
leadership in response to challenging events. As well, studying how citizens interpret, respond to, or resist leaders’ sig-
nals is a developing area of inquiry. While our study reveals some debate about the nature of crisis, and whether the 
context has changed significantly, most of the scholarship reviewed here holds modern politicians face large challenges 
in exercising leadership within precarious contexts. 
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1. Introduction 
The last several years have witnessed a welcome re-
surgence in the analysis of political leaders and the ex-
ercise of leadership. From studies of governance occur-
ring in small municipalities to agency analyses within 
supranational structures, many new works are reinvig-
orating this research area. The literature reaches back 
to the earliest period of recorded history because, 
since the beginnings of social life, people have taken 
leadership roles within groups. However, while the 
phenomenon of leadership always is present in socie-
ties, we know that how leaders lead is changeable. Our 
understanding of leadership and its evaluation neces-
sarily is grounded in our times and our context. The so-
cio-economic environment within which people lead is 
a prime determinant of how leaders must act to be ef-
fective, and how we adjudicate effective leadership. 
This environment has been subject to several signifi-
cant shocks and crisis events over the last fifteen years. 
The leadership environment certainly was influ-
enced by the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (GFC), 
where a complex interplay of lax financial policies and 
risky lending practices precipitated the worst financial 
collapse since the Great Depression. Economic growth 
declined sharply in many states; most governments 
were forced to take unusual actions to ensure credit li-
quidity, bolster trade and reassure nervous popula-
tions. Importantly, the GFC’s effects have not been 
treated as an isolated set of incidents that were man-
ageable at the margins of the world’s political systems. 
Rather, this economic crisis is prominent among a se-
ries of many unfortunate events including terrorist at-
tacks and natural disasters whose net effect seems to 
have pushed crisis management toward the top of 
leaders’ agendas.  
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Along with the frequency of recent crisis events, 
modern political leaders also face several other desta-
bilizing pressures. Massive technological change, the 
power of social media and the interconnectedness of 
globalizing markets likely exacerbate the challenge of 
managing instability. Precisely because political leader-
ship sits at the heart of how we try to understand and 
explain the functioning of political systems, there 
seems to be a concerted effort toward exploring how 
political elites might exercise leadership in contexts 
marked by change and instability. This shift in scholar-
ship is adding new information and understanding to 
an understudied area of leadership analysis: how lead-
ers lead in crisis contexts. This burgeoning literature on 
political leadership draws from several areas of social 
science, strategic studies and management studies. Au-
thors located in the Netherlands, Great Britain, the 
United States, Australia, Germany, Sweden and other 
places have contributed some important studies within 
the last several years. However, the literature’s devel-
opment since the global financial crisis peaked in 2008 
has not been seriously explored. So this paper aims to 
trace the development of the literature concerning po-
litical leadership and crisis in the post-GFC era, note its 
merits and limitations, and mark some of the more 
promising lines of inquiry. 
2. Leadership in Precarious Contexts 
In our introductory comments we touched on some of 
the key events that seem to have altered the context of 
modern political leadership and so shaped how it is be-
ing studied. It is worth briefly considering the litera-
ture’s characteristics before proceeding to locate and 
explore the approaches under study here. Prior to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 there were not 
many mainstream political scientists who focused ex-
plicitly and consistently on understanding how politi-
cians exercise leadership in contexts marked by insta-
bility, ambiguity or crisis. Following James McGregor 
Burns’ approach in his foundational work, leadership 
often was considered as the consequence of an “array 
of political motives applied to a structure of political 
opportunity”(Burns, 1978, p. 105). Rare indeed were 
texts that studiously investigated how politicians oper-
ate in conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity. Unlike 
colleagues in political economy who consciously and 
methodically incorporated these elements into their 
models, most political scientists tended to consider 
how leaders led in stable, routinized environments 
(Knight, 1971; Mueller, 2001). Of course, a few works 
such as Graeme Allison’s classic study The Essence of 
Decision probed how leaders and bureaucracies pro-
duce decisions within crisis contexts (Allison, 1971), 
and some analysts such as F.G. Bailey and Murray 
Edelman explored how leaders might bend informa-
tional ambiguity or situational uncertainty to their ends 
(Bailey, 1988; Edelman, 1988). In analyses of individual 
leaders, a handful of scholars such as Alistair Cole and 
Robert Elgie carefully focused on how leaders approach 
decision-making in unstable environments or crisis pe-
riods (Cole, 1994; Elgie, 1993). Such studies, however, 
by far were the exception rather than the rule.  
The fall of the World Trade Center Towers in 2001 
was the first of a series of traumatic events that have 
occurred over the last fifteen years. In 2004 the Madrid 
train bombings were a particularly deadly attack that 
occurred mere days before general elections in Spain. 
Hurricane Katrina, the costliest natural disaster in the 
history of the United States, struck in the summer of 
2005. It revealed governmental chaos and widespread 
disorganization in coordinating emergency response 
resources. In April of 2010, a volcano eruption in Ice-
land sent a giant ash cloud several miles into the at-
mosphere, crippling European aviation and stranding 
10.5 million passengers (Kuipers & Boin, 2015, pp. 196-
197). A massive earthquake and tsunami struck Japan 
in March of 2011, disabling one of the world’s largest 
nuclear power stations and mobilizing deep public anx-
iety about nuclear power in many other states such as 
Germany and Italy. The Fukuyama Daiichi nuclear crisis 
focused the world’s attention on key questions of gov-
ernmental transparency, public accountability and 
emergency management capacity.  
The brief review of several traumatic events that 
occurred since 2001 helps to explain why there is re-
newed interest in studying the role of governments in 
managing such crises and the responsibility of leaders 
to their publics. One of the main treatments exploring 
how leaders and public administrators ought to under-
stand and manage crisis events was Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t 
Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius’ 2005 study, The 
Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under 
Pressure (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005). While 
administrative studies of emergency management 
measures was an established literature long before 
9/11, Boin et al.’s book was among the first new 
treatments to connect this literature with the core 
questions of political leadership. Its basic argument—
that crisis management had become a defining feature 
of contemporary governance—was taken up and ex-
plored in several later works such as Governing After 
Crises: The Politics of Investigation, Accountability and 
Learning (Boin, McConnell, & ‘t Hart, 2008).  
The arrival of the global financial crisis and its after-
shocks in the form of associated events like the 2008 
riots in Greece and the 2009 Euro zone crisis simply 
further demonstrated that disorder seemed to be a 
hallmark of the new world order. The GFC began in 2006 
with a decline in housing prices in several southern US 
states. Eventually the US mortgage market collapsed, 
along with sharp international declines in real estate 
valuation, firm failures, runs on banks and intervention 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Iceland and 
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Ireland. Oliver Blanchard, an IMF economist, estimated 
that the total losses caused by the GFC exceed $4,700 
billion (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2013, p. 543).  
The GFC had large negative effects on most western 
economies and its influence was broadly distributed 
across states and regimes. Part of the public’s reaction 
to the GFC was found in the widespread perplexity that 
modern economic systems are so intertwined, and so 
vulnerable to relatively sudden dislocation. The reces-
sion initiated in 2008 proved to be a difficult period for 
governments to address in terms of how to reassure 
nervous publics, calm investors, encourage growth and 
moderate deficits. At the time of writing, many gov-
ernments continue to hope the end of this period is at 
hand, as they search for a path toward economic stabil-
ity. For scholars, the GFC provides an opportunity to 
examine whether and, if so, how analysts are ap-
proaching the role of crisis in the exercise of power. If 
we understand modern governance to take place in a 
perennially fraught environment (as some people do), 
then are we studying the interplay between political 
elites, their entourages, experts and citizens with re-
spect to crisis management? If this is under considera-
tion, how are we approaching crisis leadership? 
3. The Study of Political Leadership and Crisis  
since 2008 
To survey how political leadership is being studied 
since 2008, we identified recent work published from 
January of 2009 to December of 2015. In part owing to 
our mission to understand how the literature has de-
veloped over the last eight years or so, and because 
monographs can require much production time, the fo-
cus is on scholarly articles. We used two search meth-
ods in particular to identify suitable works. First we 
searched the Thomson Reuters Web of Science data-
base. This database is particularly helpful because it 
concentrates on peer-reviewed scientific publications, 
and largely excludes single-authored books and edited 
essay collections. Indeed, its promoters claim it is the 
world’s largest collection of research publications 
(Thomson Reuters, 2016). As well, we also searched 
the Google Scholar database, as it is a leading source 
for scholarly publication and captures some publica-
tions that are not collected by the Web of Science. 
There are a wide variety of studies within the general 
category of “leadership”. However, many of these con-
cern issues beyond our specific interests, such as stud-
ies measuring social relationships in music ensembles, 
or how to use literacy coaching to support inner city 
high school teachers. Using English-language parame-
ters we narrowed our search and looked specifically for 
scholarly articles with the words “political leadership” 
and “crisis” as topics. This strategy generated the loca-
tion of most of the texts under discussion below.  
We then parsed the search results to identify the 
sorts of studies that are the focus of our attention. Be-
cause we wanted to consider political leadership, ra-
ther than other kinds, we concentrated on publications 
located within the social science areas of government 
and law, and within the core disciplinary journals. This 
search strategy identified 81 relevant articles. Because 
we’re interested in the active scholarship concerning 
crisis leadership, we then excluded works shorter than 
ten pages in length, and some that clearly concerned 
other fields of inquiry such as health policy research. So 
we were left with 54 English-language journal articles 
concerning political leadership and crisis. A reviewer 
kindly directed out attention toward one additional 
study. We accessed this set of 55 papers and read 
them with view toward identifying some main ap-
proaches and common areas of interest. As a product 
of this additional scrutiny, the set of papers under 
study was further narrowed. Owing to the significant 
size of the literature and the balance of its content, be-
low we discuss three distinct approaches to studying 
crisis leadership that are common ones within our lit-
erature collection, rather than creating an exhaustive 
accounting of all the individual works. Thus we exam-
ine 26 scholarly papers published in 25 journals from 
January of 2009 to December of 2015. 
Our search suggests the subject of how political 
leaders engaged a specific crisis is a relatively common 
research focus. Since 2008, and in the context of the 
conclusion of the global financial crisis, researchers ac-
tively have been engaging crisis leadership. As stated 
above, in light of the many crises that have beset pub-
lic leaders in recent years, we expected that there 
would be at least some minimal treatment of this topic 
in newly published research. Our group of studies may 
be divided further into three sorts: studies that ap-
proach crisis leadership from a centralist perspective; 
those that approach crisis leadership from a decentral-
ist perspective; and those focusing on followership. We 
begin with a review of the first grouping of centralist 
approaches in part because it is by far the largest set of 
studies within our search results, and also because it 
provides a helpful contrast to the other groupings as 
discussed below.  
3.1. Centralist Perspectives on Crisis Leadership: The 
Boin–‘t Hart–McConnell School 
Within our set of leadership studies we noticed that a 
significant number of authors adopted a centralist ap-
proach. This is to say that generally these authors ex-
amined crises at the national level, and by means of fo-
cusing on how leaders at the political center managed 
crises strategically. As mentioned above, the 2005 text 
by Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sun-
delius was an important study. One of its most helpful 
insights is the overarching assertion that crises are po-
litical at heart (Boin et al., 2005, p. ix). For leadership 
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scholars, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public 
Leadership Under Pressure was innovative because it 
married some traditional, centralist perspectives found 
in the crisis management literature to some of the core 
questions within the political leadership literature. It 
bridged the two literatures, and revealed several ways 
in which the discussions of crisis management and ef-
fective public leadership could enrich each other. Our 
search for new works on crisis and political leadership 
uncovered several studies by some of these same au-
thors. Owing to the role of Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 
in particular in terms of working as a team as well as in 
co-authoring with other colleagues, and in view of the 
scope of their contributions and their analytical con-
sistency, here we refer to this scholarship cluster as the 
Boin–‘t Hart–McConnell School.  
Toward identifying the new work on crisis leader-
ship that has appeared since the GFC, in January of 
2009 an article titled “Crisis Exploitation: Political and 
Policy Impacts of Framing Contests” appeared in the 
Journal of European Public Policy (Boin, ‘t Hart, & 
McConnell, 2009). Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell built on 
some earlier work on the framing of crises, and here 
approached crises as an exercise in blame manage-
ment. They observed crises often produce change as a 
consequence of destabilizing power and authority rela-
tionships. However, it is difficult to predict with any 
certainty how changes will unfold. Relying on fifteen in-
depth cases studies, the article attempted to formulate 
a theory of crisis exploitation, which is defined as the 
“purposeful utilization of crisis-type rhetoric to signifi-
cantly alter levels of political support for public office-
holders and public policies” (Boin et al., 2009, p. 83). 
The authors concluded that crisis exploitation strate-
gies matter. Political incumbents are likely to survive 
the political game of crisis exploitation if they start out 
with a good stock of political capital, cogently com-
municate their framing of the crisis, have not held of-
fice for very long, and benefit from the perception that 
the cause of the crisis is exogenous. As well, they noted 
it may be advantageous to have an expert commission 
as the main locus of inquiry about the crisis (Boin et al., 
2009, p. 100).  
This line of inquiry was supplemented a year later 
with another study of the politics of blame. Boin, Pres-
ton, ‘t Hart, and McConnell noted much attention tra-
ditionally has been paid to the “acute response” phase 
of crises, where critical decisions are made and com-
municated to frightened publics (Boin, Preston, ‘t Hart, 
& McConnell, 2010, p. 706). However, the post-crisis 
phase, or the “crisis after the crisis”, increasingly is 
marked by intense politicization. In a single-case study 
of the Hurricane Katrina crisis, Boin et al. (2010) took a 
new tack and focused on evaluating to what degree a 
politician’s personal leadership style explains the out-
comes of crisis-induced blame games. They concluded 
President George W. Bush’s leadership style was ill fit-
ted to the sort of crisis he tried to manage. As well, his 
past decisions in the form of patronage appointments 
to key emergency management posts along with his 
proclivity to not change course despite political criti-
cism all combined to exacerbate the public’s percep-
tion of leadership failure (Boin et al., 2010, p. 720). 
Alongside these analyses of blame shifting and cri-
sis, another strand of research began to surface. Build-
ing on two articles in 2008 and 2009 co-authored with 
Mark Rhinard on the European Union’s role in manag-
ing transboundary threats and building transnational 
crisis management capacity, Boin introduced a new 
sort of crisis (Boin & Rhinhard, 2008; Rhinhard & Boin, 
2009). Crafted as the introduction to a special issue of 
the Review of Policy Research, Boin’s essay is titled 
“The New World of Crises and Crisis Management: Im-
plications for Policymaking and Research”. He argued 
that the world of crises and disasters is shifting, and 
such change presented new challenges to political-
administrative elites as well as researchers (Boin, 2009, 
p. 367). A sketch of a theoretical ideal-type of the 
modern crisis is presented.  
This new type, which he termed a transboundary 
crisis, is founded upon the traditional notion of crisis 
and its three core concepts of threat, urgency and un-
certainty. However, transboundary crises are different 
because they emanate from the “tightly woven web” 
of critical infrastructures that characterize modern so-
ciety and they can easily cross geographical borders 
(Boin, 2009, p. 368). He suggested as well that trans-
boundary crises also may jump across functional and 
productive systems, such as moving from the auto pro-
duction system to the credit system, as well across 
time. Unlike normal crises which have clear beginning 
and end points, Boin argued these new types of crises 
cannot be pinpointed in time because their roots are 
found deep within social systems and their effects may 
not be perceived for several years. Owing to their quick 
mobility, systemic depth and geographical breadth, po-
litical authorities face many challenges in deciding who 
ought to take responsibility for these events and also in 
appreciating the significant damage potential such epi-
sodes represent (Boin, 2009, pp. 368-369).  
This new thinking about the nature of transbounda-
ry crises was advanced in 2014 with the publication of 
an additional research paper. Arjen Boin, Mark Rhinard 
and Magnus Ekengren observed “the EU has modest 
but promising capacities to assist member states over-
whelmed by disaster…But these capacities do not suf-
fice in the face of transboundary crises: threats that 
cross geographical and policy borders within the Un-
ion” (Boin, Rhinard, & Ekengren, 2014, p. 131). Owing 
to its nature, transboundary crisis management re-
quires international co-ordination and co-operation. 
However, they pointed out the European Union has 
limited capacities to facilitate a joint response to a 
transboundary threat confronting multiple member 
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states. They found the “EU is still far removed from act-
ing in an autonomous fashion in response to trans-
boundary crises”, although any future crises likely will 
provide some impetus to move to a more integrated 
approach (Boin et al., 2014, p. 140). These analysts 
supported the EU’s adoption of a more active and ex-
plicit role in establishing a vision and a widely support-
ed plan for transboundary crisis management. 
In a review article published in Cooperation and 
Conflict, Paul ‘t Hart and Bengt Sundelius similarly 
aimed to call attention to the modern leadership chal-
lenges of crisis management, particularly with respect 
to increasing EU capacity to act quickly and cohesively 
(‘t Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Revisiting an agenda they 
proposed for European crisis management research 
and preparedness training a decade and a half earlier, 
they noted the “strategic use of fear has become part 
and parcel of our world” (‘t Hart & Sundelius, 2013, p. 
445). Drawing on several of Boin et al.’s observations 
about the nature of transboundary crises, ‘t Hart and 
Sundelius offered European leaders eight updated rec-
ommendations for strengthening modern crisis man-
agement efforts (Boin & Ekengren, 2009; Boin, Eken-
gren, & Rhinhard, 2013; Boin, ’t Hart & McConnell, 
2009). They noted that since their original agenda was 
formulated, international social science research on 
risk and crises has proliferated and so deepened gov-
ernmental capacity in many states. However, they ar-
gued for more systematic study of EU crisis manage-
ment practices, and more capacity to link and deploy 
experts and expertise to supply “instant” analytical 
support in times of great need (‘t Hart & Sundelius, 
2013, p. 457).  
So, the development and enrichment of the trans-
boundary crises concept has been an innovative, help-
ful contribution to thinking about crisis leadership.  
School members carefully have studied several key as-
pects of the EU’s emergency response capacities in 
light of the new crisis context, argued for more expert 
analysis on how to manage modern crises, and for 
more institutionalization of response capacity and de-
cision co-ordination across the member states. Moreo-
ver, they convincingly argued for more institutionalized 
connections between and among researchers, bureau-
crats and political decision-makers toward increasing 
the EU’s crisis management capacity. As ‘t Hart and 
Sundelius concluded, the foreseeable future “will re-
quire timely and strong political leadership to ensure 
European governments, European businesses and re-
sponsible European institutions will not be caught un-
prepared…This is not a call for one further instance of 
Brussels’ usurping national sovereignty. It is about de-
veloping a flexible capacity for joint problem-solving in 
the face of common, trans-boundary risk and threat af-
fecting all Member States” (‘t Hart & Sundelius, 2013, 
p. 457).  
In its scholarly publications since 2008, the School 
has contributed in a few other areas to the study of cri-
sis leadership. First, the evaluation of leaders has been 
engaged in three essays. The question of how to assess 
the exercise of leadership is one of the traditional nar-
ratives within the mainstream political leadership liter-
ature. However, though a risk management lens, the 
task takes on more complexity. In 2011 Paul ‘t Hart 
penned a short article on evaluating public leadership. 
He held “our expectations of leaders and leadership 
are embedded in our underlying ideas about good gov-
ernment” and these criteria have been subject to 
change in values, cultures and dominant coalitions (‘t 
Hart, 2011, p. 324). For him, public leadership assess-
ment rests on three discrete qualities that interrelate 
with each other: prudence, support and trustworthi-
ness. ‘t Hart carefully connected good leadership to the 
community’s need for safety and stability. He wrote 
that it “mobilizes collective wisdom, that elusive and 
intricate mix of analytical judgement, discernment, in-
tuition and comprehension…Effective public leadership 
is about provoking, enabling, and protecting the work 
others need to do to enable the community as a whole 
to address their most significant challenges” (‘t Hart, 
2011, p. 326).  
Two years later Arjen Boin, Sanneke Kuipers and 
Werner Overdijk published “Leadership in Times of Cri-
sis: A Framework for Assessment” (Boin, Kuipers, & 
Overdijk, 2013). They referenced ‘t Hart’s 2011 essay, 
and asked how can leadership performance during a 
crisis be reasonably assessed? In light of the argument 
that crises pose ever more difficult challenges for bu-
reaucracies, and that modern governance structures 
and cultures are not well designed to cope with radical-
ly novel situations, they set out to delineate what crisis 
leaders ought to do (Boin et al., 2013, p. 87) They pro-
ceeded to itemize the ten key tasks crisis management 
leaders face, including early recognition of threats, 
sense-making, orchestrating vertical and horizontal co-
ordination, rendering accountability and enhancing or-
ganizational resiliency. In 2015 Annika Brändström au-
thored an analysis of “Crisis Accountability: Ministerial 
Resignations in Sweden”. She examined ten crisis 
events in Sweden to evaluate ministerial survival, and 
drew from Boin et al.’s (2005, 2010) work on blame 
management during crisis to support her study 
(Brändström, 2015, p. 307). All three of these articles 
helpfully underscore that public evaluations of effec-
tive crisis leadership rest heavily on the expectations of 
citizens and communities; there is no independent 
measure for judging good crisis leadership. So one les-
son to be drawn from these analyses is that polities 
ought to decide for themselves what sorts of norma-
tive behaviors or actions they desire on the part of cri-
sis managers. In this way, then, leaders who manage 
crisis may be assessed more clearly, consistently and 
fairly, without necessarily lapsing into blame game pol-
itics or impressionistic judgments about performance.  
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A second area of research concerns information 
dissemination and crisis.  Andrew Hindmoor and Allan 
McConnell focused analytic attention on why the warn-
ing signals of an impending financial crisis seemed to be 
ignored by political elites, treasury officials and financial 
regulators (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2013, 2015). They 
noted “in the crisis and disaster literature, it is well ac-
cepted that failure is not the product of a single, con-
text-free phenomenon. Rather, failure is the product of 
multiple individual, institutional and societal factors 
that coalesce in pathological ways” (Hindmoor & 
McConnell, 2015, p. 66). They explored the nature of in-
stitutional signaling and retrospective evaluation to con-
clude key decision-makers, leaders, financial regulators 
and bank executives failed to spot evidence of the im-
pending financial crisis in the UK. So in fact it was not 
easy or possible to anticipate the crisis that unfolded.  
In a similar vein is a 2012 contribution from this 
school that merits attention. Titled “Prime Ministerial 
Rhetoric and Recession Politics: Meaning Making in 
Economic Crisis Management”, it focused on how the 
UK, Irish and Australian prime ministers tried to public-
ly explain, assess and account for the global financial 
crisis and its consequences. In many respects this study 
compares with other essays focusing on crisis leader-
ship and blame shifting as mentioned above. At the 
same time, it is quite unique in several ways. For ex-
ample, the authors pointed out that although rhetori-
cal perspectives on political leadership have a “long 
and venerable tradition,” and crisis rhetoric has been 
intensively studied in the American case, this is not 
true for parliamentary systems (Masters & ‘t Hart, 
2012, p. 760). They concluded that, owing to systemic 
differences, prime ministers face more pressure to 
manage meaning and blame than their presidential 
counterparts. So, in the face of similar crisis conditions, 
leaders may face more complexity, or less, in respond-
ing to traumatic events owing to institutional factors. 
They suggested further comparative analysis will help 
to explain the mediating effects of institutional struc-
tures on leadership styles (Masters & ‘t Hart, 2012, p. 
775). This is a superb study that, along with the others 
reviewed above, nicely demonstrates how this School’s 
authors have taken up some of the traditional research 
questions in the field of political leadership and pro-
duced innovative, fresh thinking about modern crisis 
leadership.  
The influence of the School extends well beyond its 
stable of active authors. The sort of analysis it under-
takes, and its particular success in revisiting some core 
questions about the nature of leadership within the 
modern context and from the perspective of crisis 
management, has led a few other analysts to till this 
particularly fertile field of scholarship. For example, in 
their 2015 study of how European political leaders 
made sense of the Euro Crisis, Femke van Esch and Ma-
rij Swinkels examined whether incorporating leaders’ 
personality traits will increase understanding of how 
leaders interpreted the crisis context. This article 
adopted a deep textual analysis method to test its core 
hypothesis. Many of its key conceptualizations mirror 
those of the School, especially concerning what consti-
tutes a crisis and why leaders engage in sense-making 
behavior (van Esch & Swinkels, 2015, p. 1214). The 
Boin–‘t Hart–McConnell approach to studying modern 
crisis leadership has provided an intellectually rich and 
credible foundation upon which to establish new re-
search initiatives in this field of study.  
3.2. Decentralist Perspectives on Crisis Leadership 
All of the articles discussed to this point are rather 
state-centric in their focus. This is to say that they 
share, as Daniel P. Aldrich put it, a “single-minded fo-
cus on the state and the market as the core mecha-
nisms for developing both disaster-resistant societies 
and recovery schemes” (Aldrich, 2011, p. 61). Our 
search for new scholarly treatments of political leader-
ship under crisis revealed several analyses that merit 
recognition for their decentralist perspective. In a Poli-
cy and Politics article titled “Local Government and 
Structural Crisis: An Interpretive Approach”, Kevin Orr 
suggested many analysts (including those within the 
School) remain uninterested in the underlying causes 
of crises or the structural context in which they occur 
(Orr, 2009, p. 40). Orr pointed out that local govern-
ment, although often ignored in crisis treatments, is an 
important site for exploring crisis as it is a part of gov-
ernment that is particularly exposed to direct expres-
sions of crisis (Orr, 2009, p. 44).1 He concluded that the 
UK case finds “leaders do not simply manage ‘objec-
tive’ crises, but may also choose to construct crises in 
order to pursue particular courses of action” (Orr, 
2009, p. 52). 
Orr’s focus on crisis as a discourse that can be con-
structed and manipulated is similar to Benjamin Mof-
fitt’s treatise on “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for 
Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Populism”. Mof-
fitt held “crises are never ‘neutral’ phenomena but 
must be mediated and ‘performed’ by certain actors” 
(Moffitt, 2015, p. 190). Rather than being external to 
populism, crisis should be acknowledged as a feature 
that is internal to populism. So, in a sense, “if we do 
not have the performance of crisis, we do not have 
populism” (Moffitt, 2015, p. 191). The notion that 
leaders address crisis through the prism of institution-
ally- bounded performance is explored in John 
Gaffney’s study of “Political Leadership and the Politics 
of Performance: France, Syria and the Chemical Weap-
ons Crisis of 2013”. Gaffney concluded that the institu-
tion of the French presidency obliges its incumbent to 
                                                          
1 For a clear and detailed account of the virtues of keeping crisis 
decision-making close to local authorities, see Shinoda (2013).  
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be “on stage” permanently (Gaffney, 2014, p. 223). 
The Orr, Moffitt and Gaffney studies exemplify an 
approach to crisis and political leadership that moves 
beyond considering crises as rather unidimensional ex-
ogenous shocks that must be managed by experts and 
politicians. Rather from their particular vantage points 
they inquire into the structure, and the structuring, of 
crisis events. Each author suggests that crises can in-
fluence the distribution of resources and power, and so 
precarious leadership contexts may be understood to 
have a subtle utility. In engaging crises leaders can 
gain, or lose, resources. And so in focusing on the 
deeper meaning of crisis events and their role in struc-
turing community power, these studies are similar to 
another category of approach that appeared in our 
search: the heresthetics of crisis leadership. 
In their study titled “Transforming Power Relation-
ships: Leadership, Risk, and Hope”, James H. Read and 
Ian Shapiro examined how leaders manage to resolve 
chronic community conflict in cases such as the “Trou-
bles” in Northern Ireland, and racial conflict in South 
Africa. These authors explored how leaders might un-
dertake “strategically hopeful action” which is a certain 
kind of “calculated risk-taking in the face of imponder-
ably complex circumstances” (Read & Shapiro, 2014, p. 
41). In their persuasive analysis of how leaders can ini-
tiate co-operation across divided communities, the au-
thors referenced William Riker’s work on heresthetics, 
or the “art of political manipulation” (Read & Shapiro, 
2014, p. 46). Their treatment emphasizes that routine 
leadership cannot resolve deep conflict because ordi-
nary political incentives simply reinforce the status quo 
(Read & Shapiro, 2014, p. 52).  
Riker’s heresthetic approach was employed by Tim 
Heppell to study David Cameron’s Conservative party. 
He suggested particularly that it is the transformation 
of the Conservatives from a state of “’systemic crisis’ to 
stalling the realignment of the left and establishing a 
realignment of the right” that merits investigation 
(Heppell, 2013, p. 264). In a careful account, Heppell 
aimed to reveal the logic of Cameron’s coalition deal 
with the Liberal Democrats and his effort to recon-
struct the political centre in the United Kingdom. The 
author concluded that “the concept of heresthetics 
reminds us that political agency matters. It directs us 
toward the idea that skillful political leaders can out-
maneuver political adversaries, can redefine political 
situations, can reframe policy options, can manipulate 
agendas and can change the process through which po-
litical debates and decisions are undertaken (Heppell, 
2013, p. 277). The Read and Shapiro study along with 
the Heppell analysis underscore that some kinds of cri-
sis are not simply random, exogenous shocks. Crisis 
may originate in long simmering organizational frac-
tures that foster deeply held animosities. Their resolu-
tion requires the skills of a master heresthetician to 
fundamentally change the underlying communal dy-
namics for the benefit of the group. Therefore certain 
contexts may indeed require a specific sort of extraor-
dinary leadership that lies beyond the crisis-resolution 
capacities of the state, the market and the ordinary ex-
ercise of power.  
3.3. Followership Studies 
Our search of the scholarly literature published in the 
wake of the global financial crisis revealed another kind 
of focus for leadership scholars: followers. Here ana-
lysts represent a variety of approaches and address 
quite different conundrums, yet there is an interesting 
commonality in their focus. For example, in 2011 Emili-
ano Grossman and Cornelia Woll inquired why the ser-
vices directive proposed by Internal Market Commis-
sioner Frits Bolkestein provoked such a backlash in 
France, as well as in Sweden, Belgium, Germany and It-
aly. They asserted their findings illustrate the im-
portance of political leadership in institutional devel-
opment, particularly vis-à-vis understanding resistance 
(Grossman & Woll, 2011, p. 346). Although France con-
sistently has scored highest on economic fear 
measures since the early 2000s, they concluded the 
virulent reaction to the Bolkestein directive was rooted 
in a leadership crisis within the Socialist Party (Gross-
man & Woll, 2011, p. 360).  
Geoffrey Evans and Kat Chzhen also focused on 
public reaction to the GFC and a decline in leader repu-
tation to explain voters’ defection from the British La-
bour party. After examining individual-level panel data 
to compare possible explanations, they concluded that, 
despite its magnitude and global significance, the 2008 
financial crisis had a limited impact on the 2010 elec-
tion in part because the event was not specific to Brit-
ain. So the attribution of responsibility could therefore 
be broadened (Evans & Chzhen, 2013, p. 9). Neil Robin-
son, in a paper titled “Russia’s Response to Crisis: The 
Paradox of Success”, underscored Russia’s experience 
with the GFC was unusual: after the event’s initial, 
deep impact the economy recovered relatively quickly. 
Russia did not plunge into recession for as long as 
some other countries. Echoing the Evans and Chzhen 
findings, Robinson noted extant treatments assume in-
cumbent governments are less likely to be blamed by 
their citizenry when economic shocks are exogenous, 
as in the case of the GFC (Robinson, 2013, p. 451). 
However, in the Russian case, citizens perceived the 
economy was recovering without getting better even 
though economic growth returned in 2009. He found 
this view arose partly because the financial crisis was 
seen as a manifestation of deeper problems and that a 
recovery that failed to deal with these problems was 
perceived to lack worth (Robinson, 2013, p. 469). So, 
leaders’ miscommunications and strategic errors 
worked to perpetuate citizens’ sense of economic dis-
location long after the recovery had begun. 
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These three studies helpfully signal how the litera-
ture is evolving. First, and importantly, all three clearly 
are concerned to understand and explain public views 
and reactions. This is a welcome and necessary coun-
terweight to a strong tendency among leadership 
scholars to focus on the decision-makers and ignore 
followers (Kellerman, 2008). Second, these three stud-
ies share a common interest in exploring how citizens 
respond to change, whether change appears as a long-
term political transformation or as an unpredictable 
but significant financial shock. There is great need for 
more understanding of followers’ roles and responsibil-
ities with respect to change and crisis leadership. 
4. Discussion 
So, in considering scholarly analyses of political leader-
ship and crisis topics that have been published from 
2009 to the end of 2015, we located a significant num-
ber of works that adopt a centralist perspective, and 
are associated with three scholars in particular: Arjen 
Boin, Paul ‘t Hart and Allan McConnell. We chose to 
group them into one category (the Boin–‘t Hart–
McConnell School) and reviewed the main areas of fo-
cus and some new lines of inquiry. As the relative size 
of the collection suggests, this is a burgeoning litera-
ture that is producing many new insights into public 
leadership in the modern crisis context. The School’s 
common method of approaching the subject—as an 
exercise in crisis management—is helpful in terms of 
building a unified understanding across many sorts of 
cases and particular topics. At the same time the 
method is limited owing to its tendency to treat the 
crisis condition as an exogenous problem—with a clear 
beginning and ending—that central decision-makers 
must address. As well, the works reviewed here tend to 
place much more emphasis on the leaders and their 
strategic behavior rather than on the publics. This ap-
proach’s strengths lie in its insight into analyzing how 
political leaders and decision makers ought to act once 
a crisis appears.  
In contrast with this centralist approach, we discern 
a second grouping of studies that are common in their 
decentralist perspective. Kevin Orr’s interpretive ap-
proach to local government and structural crisis high-
lights that many analyses of crisis leadership largely ig-
nore the underlying causes of crises and the structural 
context in which they occur. Moreover, because local 
governments often are the first responders to many 
sorts of crisis, and because they are a usual contact 
point between the community and government, they 
offer an excellent locale for the study of crisis leader-
ship. Benjamin Moffitt (2015) and John Gaffney’s 
(2014) considerations of crisis performance nicely 
complement the articles by Tim Heppell (2013), and 
James Read and Ian Shapiro (2014), although this may 
not be apparent at first blush. The authors are com-
mon in their understanding of crises as social situations 
that are structured by the populations that participate 
in them. Leaders, as Read and Shapiro (2014) and Tim 
Heppell (2013) remind us, sometimes can exercise ex-
traordinary agency and restructure a divided and diffi-
cult social environment toward the common good.  
Our review reveals clear interest in studying how 
followers respond to crisis contexts, and how they in-
terpret leaders’ messaging and cues. The case of the 
French backlash to the Bolkestein directive under-
scores the pivotal role micro-institutional dynamics like 
internal party strife can play in large-scale change pro-
cesses. It is interesting to note that Evans and Chzhen 
(2013) find the international significance of the 2008 
financial crisis probably insulated politicians from elec-
toral repercussions because responsibility for it could 
be attributed to events beyond Britain’s borders. How-
ever, in the Russian case citizens remained critical of 
their leaders’ economic management capacity long af-
ter the relatively mild effects of the recession dissipat-
ed. These studies aim in part to explain how followers 
react and respond to crisis contexts. They illustrate the 
complexity of crisis leadership and also the opportunity 
for further research into communication flows be-
tween leaders and the led. In their attention to citi-
zens’ responses and to probing the structural aspects 
of crises, these authors contribute rich and helpful in-
sights, and it is instructive to reconsider the literature 
delineated in the first grouping in light of the complex 
issues raised by the authors in the second and third 
grouping.  
Moving our focus from the narrow analysis of the 
three groupings discussed above toward a broader 
consideration of the 26 articles as a single body of 
work, we think it’s helpful to point out there are sever-
al disagreements among the authors about the nature 
of crisis and the current political context. Concerning 
the nature of crisis, there are a variety of views. Many 
of the authors reviewed here consider crises simply as 
random, unpredictable events that are part and parcel 
of the normal socio-economic environment, and there 
is merit in this view. While there is no doubt that 
events of 9/11 were important, this was not the first 
time the United States experienced terrorism, nor was 
it the first time al-Qaeda attacks resulted in the death 
of Americans. Likewise, while the GFC had a tremen-
dous impact on the global economy, so did the bursting 
of the “dot com bubble” in 2000 as well as the Asian, 
Russian and Mexican financial crises of the 1990s. Con-
ducting crisis research based on the premise that each 
catastrophe intrinsically is novel certainly runs the risk 
of merely putting old wine in new bottles. At the same 
time, some scholars firmly engage the position that 
there are different kinds of crises and that new types of 
crises can develop. Moreover, a few advance the view 
that some sorts of crises may be more challenging than 
others to manage because they are more trenchant 
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(see for example Read & Shapiro, 2014) or owing to 
their unusual nature. The conceptualization of trans-
boundary crisis is a good example of the latter ap-
proach (e.g. Boin & Rhinhard, 2008). 
Within the body of work on crisis leadership, schol-
ars disagree as well whether the political context has 
changed or remained the same. For many analysts, the 
larger environment within which leadership occurs is 
much the same as it was before 9/11. In other cases, 
scholars hold that the current context profoundly has 
changed. Owing in part to large-scale social, economic 
and technological change, modern political leaders op-
erate in a different, less secure and less stable decision-
making environment than their predecessors. In this 
view, incremental change and enduring institutional 
stability seem to be antiquated markers of an earlier 
period. As a consequence the necessity to engage in 
crisis management has become more central to leader-
ship behavior, as many analysts within the School hold. 
For our part, we think such debate about the nature of 
modern crises, and the current context within which 
crisis leadership occurs, present exciting avenues for 
new investigations and necessary analysis.  
As a final comment on the body of work we have 
reviewed here, although we located many excellent 
studies in the period under review that adopted a vari-
ety of methods and perspectives, we were surprised 
that one paradigm in particular largely has not been 
taken up by crisis leadership scholars: the VUCA ap-
proach. The notion of VUCA originally was introduced 
by the US Army War College to describe the world fol-
lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union: volatile, uncer-
tain, complex and ambiguous (Casey, 2014, p. 75). It 
was not until the 9/11 attacks that it gained attention 
for its utility in describing a new leadership environ-
ment. As Lawrence (2013) explains, the acronym cap-
tures fours aspects of the precarious contexts sur-
rounding modern leaders. The “V” stands for volatility, 
which is understood to mean the nature, speed, vol-
ume and magnitude of unpredictable change. The “U” 
represents uncertainty. Uncertainty is a product of vol-
atility, and it confounds efforts to make decisions, and 
accurately predict results. Within the VUCA acronym, 
“C” stands for complexity, and represents numerous 
causes and mitigating factors involved in a problem. Fi-
nally, the “A” indicates the ambiguity resulting from a 
lack of clarity about the meaning of an event which is 
held to be symptomatic of modern decision-making 
contexts (Lawrence, 2013, p. 6). Since its creation, sev-
eral authors have written about VUCA from the per-
spective of business management, executive develop-
ment and organizational management (for example 
Rodriguez & Rodriguez, 2015). However, in our search 
at least, this approach has not yet been clearly adopted 
by leadership scholars. Given the leadership literature’s 
well demonstrated capacity to borrow from other dis-
ciplines, it is somewhat surprising that the VUCA view 
remains rather undeveloped. This paradigm may be a 
useful one to pursue for those who hold we are in a 
new crisis context, particularly because it assumes the 
current political context represents a new, more pre-
carious reality that is marked by endemic instability 
and the necessity for perennial crisis management on 
the part of elites.  
5. Conclusion 
Our understanding of leadership and its evaluation 
necessarily is grounded in our times and our social con-
text. The resurgence of scholarly interest in studying 
political leadership is a welcome trend. However, the 
9/11 attacks seemed to introduce a new precarious-
ness into the modern leadership context, and the 2008 
global financial crisis seemed to confirm that modern 
political leaders regularly face traumatic and destabiliz-
ing events, and are expected to manage them skillfully. 
To survey how political leadership is being studied 
since 2008, we identified recent work published from 
January of 2009 to December of 2015. We carefully ex-
amined 26 academic articles that focused on political 
leadership and crisis, and identified a significant 
amount of new scholarship in this area. The literature 
has been enriched by contributions from three leading 
scholars who, along with their associates, have con-
tributed many excellent insights through studying tra-
ditional leadership questions via a crisis management 
perspective.  
As well, there is a cluster of scholars whose work 
conceptualizes crises as complex, decentralized, multi-
dimensional phenomena. Finally, our examination 
found promising new work on the response of follow-
ers to leaders’ behaviors and signals. Understanding 
when and how followers accept, resist or misinterpret 
leaders’ signals certainly is fundamental to the study of 
leadership. These analyses probe some of the oppor-
tunities for deep change that crises present, and de-
mand. In the works reviewed here, analysts disagree 
about whether modern crises might be different than 
earlier ones, and whether the modern political environ-
ment has shifted fundamentally in the last fifteen years. 
At the same time, most of the scholarship affirms mod-
ern political leaders retain much capacity to respond to 
crises, manage their effects, demonstrate agency and 
adapt to new decision-making environments. 
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